This paper develops a graphical analysis and an analytical model that demonstrate how weak substitution can be used for non-market valuation. Weak complementarity and weak substitution represent preference restrictions that allow us to develop equivalent price changes to describe quantity or quality changes in non-market goods. The price changes are Hicksian equivalents in that they yield the same utility changes as would the quantity or quality changes. After discussion of several potential applications of weak substitution, the paper develops the parallel between the restriction and recent strategies from modeling differentiated goods.
I. Introduction
Revealed preference (RP) methods for non-market valuation generally ignore weak substitution (WS), a form of demand interdependency introduced by Feenberg and Mills [1980] nearly thirty years ago. This restriction focuses on a relationship between a private good and a non-market good or service that has value when the relative price of the private good is high.
Alternatively, when consumption of the private good (the weak substitute) reaches some level, further increases in the non-market service have no value.
Numerous RP applications assume weak complementarity (WC), an alternative form of demand interdependency. Weak complementarity refers to a situation where an individual is unwilling to give up resources to increase the amount of a non-market service if he does not consume some positive amount of a private good (the weak complement). Thus, the non-market service has no "value" without consumption of this complementary good. Mäler [1974] credits Stevens [1966] with the original insights that motivate his analysis. Since this early discussion, which began with the role of water quality and the demand for water-based recreation, environmental applications have provided a number of examples where a private good can be described as a weak complement to an environmental service. The service usually plays a role that is analogous to a quality attribute of a private good.
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In the same time span that the relevance of weak complementarity has grown, weak substitution has languished. Evidence of this trend can be found in the revised edition of 1 This logic was used (without appreciating the connection to weak complementarity) in Bresnahan and Gordon's [1997] introduction to the issues posed in modeling the demand for new goods. It is also important to the restrictions required to recover the Hicksian demand for a non-market good from the Marshallian demand for a non-market good from the Marshallian demand for the private weak complement. See Bullock and Minot [2006] and Von Haefen [2007] for discussion.
Freeman's classic treatment of non-market valuation methods. After reviewing the concept in some detail in his 1992 book, he seems to have reflected the apparent professional consensus and excluded weak substitution from his revised edition (see Freeman [1992 Freeman [ , 2003 ). 2 He maintains that an assumption of less than perfect substitution is not especially informative without including a more detailed preference specification.
The interpretation of marginal benefits relies on the idea that individuals will substitute among goods and services in response to changes in the natural environment. The tension between this fundamental insight and the claim that there are few clear-cut examples of substitution in revealed preference models is the first sign that something is amiss in the literature.
The household production models used to motivate estimates of defensive expenditures or the cost of illness and mitigation offer the most compelling examples. Bockstael and McConnell [2007] consider these models among other revealed preference models relevant to environmental economics. Their summary allows several direct conclusions. If we assume that a non-market service (a public good or a bad) enters a household production technology along with a private good that serves as a perfect substitute, then this provides a direct basis for measuring the Hicksian willingness to pay for a change in the non-market good. More specifically, for strongly separable household production technologies, the non-market good acts like an augmentation to income. The Hicksian welfare measure for changes in that public good can be derived from the changes in the amount of the private good necessary to hold the level of 2 Bockstael and McConnell [2007] offer some discussion of weak substitution, noting that: "…case in which such a threshold [level of use of a private good where changes in the non-market service do not matter] makes sense are not easily identified" (p. 258) They conclude their section suggesting that weak substitution may help to motivate how information about mitigating behaviors can be used to measure the welfare effects of degradations in environmental quality.
household production constant. 3 In the absence of perfect substitution, the Hicksian compensating surplus is not directly measured by defensive expenditures since in this case the marginal cost of the produced good will vary with the adaptation to a change in the non-market good.
How are these theoretical observations relevant to empirical work? Most applications that explore substitution relationships have focused on establishing bounds on welfare changes but in some cases have not clearly addressed interpretation of the bounds 4 . Moreover, we are not aware of applications that use a specific form of substitution to recover estimates of Hicksian consumer surplus for changes in a non-market good. Indeed, following Bartik [1988] , Freeman argues that, at best, substitution offers upper and lower bounds for Hicksian welfare measures.
A new set of questions facing environmental and security-related policy analysts may require re-thinking this judgment. In some applications ex ante mitigation activities are best described as weak substitutes for non-market goods (or bads). Suppose, for example, we consider the risk of the risk of wildfire damage to a home. Improvements to a public fire protection system provide some reduction in this risk; the public good is the risk reduction associated with the public fire protection system (or alternatively the public bad is the risk due to a lack of such resources). Suppose a homeowner can contract for private services, such as those offered by AIG's Wildfire Protection Unit, that protect its home through various means and thus reduce the risk of wildfire damage to the home. When the level of private protection is consistent with complete protection of a home, one might argue that the homeowner no longer values increases in the level of resources devoted to the public fire protection system. In this case, the expenditure on private fire services serves as a weak substitute for the risk reduction associated with the public provision of fire protection. Of course, our argument, which assumes the homeowner is concerned only with the physical structure of the home, may represent a simplification of the actual situation. For example, the homeowner may still value the risk reduction associated with public protection to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of harm to neighbors, continued inconvenience from evacuations, or reduced property value from the destruction of adjacent homes. We discuss this example in more detail, and introduce two additional examples of weak substitution, in section II. While not perfect, our example is intended to illustrate the potential relevance of substitution relationships that can arise from identifying thresholds in the patterns of the tradeoffs people would make to compensate for changes in non-market resources.
This paper has three objectives. First, we develop the graphical approach introduced in Smith and Banzhaf [2004] to demonstrate how changes in substitution effects influence the Hicksian price equivalents defined for either WC or WS. In addition, we adapt the arguments of Bullock and Minot [2006] and Reiss and White [2007] to show how the WS restriction allows recovery of Hicksian consumer surplus measures for changes in non-market services from the Marshallian demand for a private weak substitute. Second, we illustrate, using an algebraic example, the steps one would implement to derive Hicksian consumer surplus measures with WS. Our example adapts earlier research by Larson [1991] , who showed how WC reveals sufficient information to describe the role of the non-market good in quasi-expenditure functions.
Finally, we discuss the relationship between WS and WC and provide a general characterization of the role of the two restrictions for non-market valuation.
II. Hicksian Equivalent Price Changes
Recently Smith and Banzhaf [2007] adapted the rationing literature to demonstrate why weak complementarity and the Willig [1978] condition are sufficient to specify a quality adjusted price index. The index defines the price adjustment equivalent to the Hicksian consumer surplus (i.e., the income adjustment) for a change in a non-market good or a quality attribute. In section IV, we extend their graphical framework to describe weak substitution in an analogous way. Here, we introduce the graphical analysis using the case of weak complementarity. In the expressions that follow, line segments are denoted with upper bars to distinguish them from products.
We begin with standard (linear) demand and indifference curve representations of the change in Marshallian consumer surplus associated with decrease in the price of a private good.
With a decrease in the price of private good X from 0 P to 1 P , the area 
Rearranging terms, we have equation (2):
Panel B of figure 1 provides a representation of this relationship using the corresponding indifference curves. Assume the interior budget constraint corresponds to 0 P for X and the exterior to 1 P . The tangency at point A corresponds to 1 X and at point C to 0 X . The . Substituting from the relationships in (3) yields the result:
A similar logic illustrates how changes in (the quality of) a public good, denoted q, can be described using equivalent (in welfare terms) price changes. Consider first the case of weak complementarity (with X and q as weak complements) depicted in figure 2. Weak complementarity implies increases in q have no value to the consumer who selects zero consumption of X. Figure 2 illustrates the implications of this for the indifference curve analysis; the indifference curves for a given utility level, denoted Vˆ, with different levels of q (i.e.,
, will intersect at the same point (R) on the vertical axis (i.e., where 0 = X ).
To develop the argument that describes how a change in q can be represented with price equivalents, we start at point A in figure 2 where quality is 0 q , the price of good X is 0 P , utility is Vˆ, income is T , and the budget constraint is given by ___ TN . Suppose quality improves from 0 q to 1 q . At the new higher level of q, the indifference curve in X-z space is lower everywhere but at point R where consumption of the weak complement is zero (i.e., X = 0). In figure 2 the indifference map appears to fan inward. That is, quality improvements imply an inward fanning because the amounts of the weak complement (X) and the numeraire (z) required to maintain the same level of utility, Vˆ, decrease as q increases. The WTP for this quality change, holding both utility and price constant is given by: q , the price of good X is 0 P , utility is still Vˆ, income is
, and the budget constraint is ___ SM .
We use the unique features of this indifference map to define a price change for X that is equivalent in welfare terms to the change in q. As noted,
However, an improvement in q from q 0 to q 1 with income fixed at the feasible budget set defined by ___ TN implies a higher realized level of utility (higher than Vˆ). The compensating surplus associated with this quality improvement (WTP*) measures the amount of income that must be taken away, given the improved quality, to assure that the individual's utility would remain at Vˆ. 5 The Hicksian consumer surplus measure associated with the quality change is given by the difference in the Hicksian surplus for the market good at the two quality levels.
( )
represents the choke price. Integration yields (
] forgoing the quality improvement with the price of X at its original level (point A) and 2) getting the quality improvement with the increased price of X (point C). Note that income is equal to T and utility is Vˆ at both points A and C. Thus, points A and C in figure 2 are associated with different points along the Hicksian demand surface ((i.e., with price, quality, and quantity demanded varying) defined for Vˆ. 6 An alternative measure for the compensating surplus from a change in q is the equivalent surplus. This surplus is measured by the reduction in the price of X equivalent to a loss in quality from q 1 to q 0 . To construct this price equivalent, begin at point A′ where income is equal to S, 
III. Weak Substitution -Introduction and Examples
Weak substitution assumes the existence of a level of consumption for the private good (the weak substitute) above which improvements in the non-market good have no value. When consumption of the weak substitute is below this threshold, denoted a X , then quality improvements are valuable. The logic uses an analogy to the links implied by the economic descriptions of rationing models for individual demand in the presence of quantity restrictions.
That is, quality improvements are valuable when the price of the weak substitute exceeds the price consistent with the threshold quantity demanded of X, a X . Let P a denote the price that yields this threshold consumption level. 8 With m denoting income, expression (6) implicitly defines P a.
Given (6), the formal definition for weak substitution is given in equation (7):
where m is income. This condition does not preclude income affecting the value of a quality change but restricts it to change proportionately with demand for the good experiencing the change. In the case of WC or WS it restricts how the demands for the weak complement or substitute may change with income. See Willig [1978] , Palmquist [2005] and Smith and Banzhaf [2007] for further discussion. 8 P a is the Marshallian virtual price to realize X a and it is a function defined by the specified level of X a and the level of q as well as the prices of other goods and income. We illustrate how this relationship influences the direction of the Hicksian surplus below.
Figure 3 illustrates the indifference curves associated with weak substitution. As with weak complementarity, the level of utility is constant at Vˆ for the two indifference curves in the figure, with the inward fanning denoting quality improvements. The shape of the indifference curve to the right of X a varies with each application. As drawn, the indifference curve continues to slope downward for levels of the weak substitute above a X representing the case where the weak substitute, X, but not q, continues to have value beyond the threshold consumption level.
Examples of weak substitution usually involve cases where the private good serving as a weak substitute for some non-market service mitigates low levels of the non-market service or an undesirable outcome. As noted earlier, Bockstael and McConnell [2007] argue it is difficult to identify convincing examples of weak substitution. This difficulty may have arisen because the search for examples has been confined to continuous relationships. Weak substitution is easiest to illustrate when we recognize the potential for discrete changes in tradeoffs. Bockstael and McConnell [2007] cite a water filtration system as a potential example. However, they ultimately preclude this case arguing that because the scenario involves a discrete set of equipment, it does not represent a discrete change in what had previously been a smooth substitution relationship. In part this perspective depends on how we define the choice problem.
Consider the relationship between drinking water quality and investments in plumbing infrastructure and characterize the decision process using all the expenditures on plumbing equipment defined as a single aggregate. In this case, the purchase of a filtration system would add to the aggregate plumbing expenditures. Such a model might display a change in the value of drinking water quality with changes in the mount of an aggregate of plumbing infrastructure because of the purchase of filtration equipment. That is, when we can identify the filtration system as motivating the improvement in water quality, it may be reasonable to suggest that the purchase results in an individual being unconcerned about contaminants affecting water quality.
When we observe a threshold at a given level of expenditures, then it appears to be a smooth increase in the amount of plumbing infrastructure.
Our point is simple. It may be difficult to suggest technologies for weak substitutes as smooth changes in the consumption of some good that leads to discrete changes in the preferences for an amenity. Instead, we may need to identify specific appliances, types of equipment, or even houses (e.g., one close to work and another in a pristine area as a weekend getaway). In what follows we describe three situations where WS offers a potential basis for explaining the link between the private goods and non-market services. However the existence of such discreteness in the supply of commodities such as housing choices within a community stem from the technologies used to describe how these commodities are produced. The assumptions used to describe the supply process are separate from the assumed shape of preferences. We propose to model preferences as smooth even if the budget set constraining choices is not.
A. "Concierge" Private Protection
As discussed in the introduction, private fire protection provides our first example of WS.
Such protection is offered to high-end property owners in Malibu, Beverly Hills, Newport Beach, and Menlo Park as well as in a dozen Colorado resort communities by AIG's Wildfire Protection
Unit. According to news accounts, the service, which involves private firefighters, was effective in saving a number of homes in the California counties hardest hit by wildfires. A Los Angeles
Times story on the fire protection services indicates that the AIG Private Client Group Insurance began in 2000 and has grown to nearly 1 billion dollars in gross premiums. 9 Policyholders pay annual premiums of more than $10,000 for homes valued at more than $1 million. The firm also offers a similar service for hurricanes which involves dispatching pre-disaster consultants to assess shutter protection, property storage, and landscaping. The service also provides help with restoration and repairs after storms. As an alternative to concierge fire protection, some homeowners in fire prone areas purchase, for about $1000, and apply a fire retardant similar to that used by the U.S. Forest Service. This first example of WS illustrates how heterogeneity in preferences and abilities to pay imply differences in the virtual price thresholds for weak substitutes for public protection services among different households.
B. Health Production
A second class of applications involves private behaviors to avert and mitigate environmental health impacts due to exposures to environmental pollutants. For example, asthma 9 Yoshimo [2007] notes a historical example of private fire protection in Richmond, Virginia, in the 1800s.
medicine may represent a weak substitute for improvements in the air quality conditions that households face. Under this interpretation when the medicine is sufficiently cheap, improvements in air quality are irrelevant.
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Most discussions of mitigation rely on some specified health production function and use the relationship between measures of environmental quality and purchased inputs to derive measures of the willingness to pay for improvements in quality (see Freeman [2003] for an overview and Agee and Crocker [1996] as an example). Epidemiological research suggests high concentrations of ground level ozone can affect the frequency and severity of asthma attacks if asthmatic children are outside during these episodes (see Friedman et. al. [2001] ). Under these conditions the services of a high-quality day care (or the time of one household member)
supervising young children during periods of high ozone could also be treated as a weak substitute. To implement the model empirically, one would require a detailed record of the time profile of ozone conditions and an especially extensive record of how households with young asthmatic children respond by allocating their time or resources to assure their children avoid these exposures.
C. Disasters and Self Protection
A final class of applications involves homeland security and the precautions households can take to purchase extra food, water, and emergency supplies as well as prescription drugs as a form of mitigation to avoid serious impacts from short term interruptions in supply chains due to natural disasters or terrorist activities. 12 These resources could be described as weak substitutes for resources devoted to public activities intended to reduce the risk of short term disruptions.
Durable and non-durable goods can play a mitigating role in the presence of natural and man-made disasters. Some households maintain inventories of food, water, and medicines to respond to short-term disasters. Others have private wells, electric generators, wood burning stoves, etc. in part to respond to short term outages in public sources for water or power.
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Purchases of auxiliary power or water supplies may, in some situations, be treated as weak substitutes for services to respond to disruptions in public systems. For example, if the price of household, point-of-use, water treatment were low enough (including any shadow costs associated with non-price rationing), then some public water treatment services would not be missed. 14 Indeed, recent discussions of the adaptation strategies for responding to climate induced water shortages in the Southwest suggest decentralizing water treatment to the household level and greater use of grey water as feasible options for responding to the need for water treatment facilities and to reduce pressures on water demands for some uses. In another context, if the price of a generator (at the extensive margin) and/or the price of fuel (at the intensive margin) were low enough, then a power failure would not disrupt the flow of electricity 12 Using Knowledge Network's internet panel the first author on this paper, Carol Mansfield and Aaron Strong collected information about households' stated preferences for public activities to protect the food supply. Part of the survey included information on non-prescription and prescription medicines households had on hand to deal with food borne illness that might be associated with contamination of the food supply. A simple regression of the count of six medicines or related equipment (i.e. thermometer) study participants had on hand indicated that income, awareness of the potential for food-borne illnesses, experience with cases of food poisoning, and risk attitudes were significant determinants (with p-values of 0.10 or smaller) of the count of mitigating substances households had on hand. This simple reduced form model is consistent with the observable sources of heterogeneity in consumer preferences for mitigation of environmental and other public "bads" that the weak substitution restriction can describe. 13 Often these decisions serve multiple objectives. As a result, it is not possible to associate the tradeoffs they imply exclusively with a specific non-market good (or bad) as a substitute. However, this jointness in objectives is not always present and we raise them here as an opportunity for future research. 14 In the north eastern corner of Maricopa County in Arizona, public water supplies are becoming more uncertain for private homeowners. Wells are also unreliable sources for water with persistent droughts. As a result a number of the homeowners have installed large private water tanks to ensure a reliable water supply independent of the decisions of water providers for the general public.
to some households. More generally private storage capacity is a weak substitute for reliability as an attribute of the supply chains for a wide array of non-perishable goods. In the context of perishable commodities we might consider the services of freezers as another type of storage capacity that also serves as a weak substitute for the reliability of supplies of these types of foods.
Each of these examples offers an opportunity to observe the tradeoffs a specific group of households would be willing to make for a change (or to avoid a change) in one or more nonmarket goods. Private expenditures (or insurance payments) are generally not available with sufficient spatial resolution to undertake a test without significant data collection. However, often analysts do not consider looking for the required supplementary data without a clear theoretical basis to describe how the data would be used to estimate these incremental values. In the next section we develop the weak substitution argument in three ways. First, we illustrate WS graphically. Second, we discuss how Bullock and Minot [2006] could be adapted for WS.
Finally, we modify Larson's [1991] early example using weak complementarity for the case of weak substitution.
IV. Weak Substitution: Graphical and Algebraic Analysis

A. Describing Weak Substitution with Graphs
Figure 4 describes how a change in the quality (or quantity) of a non-market good can be translated into a Hicksian price equivalent for the case of weak substitution. The two panels in the figure illustrate the roles of the relative prices of X and z. In panel A the budget constraint pivots at a X . Thus, as drawn, consumption of X equal to the threshold level, a X , would exhaust income resulting in zero consumption of z (i.e., income = ⋅ a a X P ). Panel B places the X intercept to the right of the threshold.
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In both panels, the pivot of the budget constraint from the outer budget line, tangent to ( ) 0 q V at point A, to the inner constraint and corresponding tangency at point C, defines a change in the relative price of z. As a result, in the analysis that follows we do not restrict the price of z to one. Rather, we modify the price of z to account for the change in q with weak substitution, as we did for the price of the weak complement above. The budget constraint tangent at point A depicts the lower price for the numeraire good z, denoted ( )
. The inner budget constraint, tangent at point C, relates to the higher price, ( )
. By construction, points A and C lie along the same "Hicksian demand" surface with the price of z, quality, and quantity demanded varying at different points but utility constant and equal to Vˆ (This is not a traditional income compensated Hicksian demand, but as we noted earlier in note #6 one in which q and P z vary together to hold utility constant) 16 .
In this case, P a times the average of ___ AB and ___ CD (measured along the X-axis) corresponds to the Hicksian surplus for the price (and quality) change as detailed in equations (8a) through (8c). 17 The threshold price for the weak substitute, P a , enters equations (8a) - (8c) because we measure the length of the line segments in units of X assuming the price of X is fixed
Expressions (8a) - (8c) . Since income and prices are unchanged but q has improved, the indifference curve represents a higher level of utility. It remains tangent to the same budget constraint in z-X space, but since q and z are substitutes, it is tangent at a point representing lower expenditures on X.
Closer inspection of the figure reveals that z in fact serves as a weak complement to q.
That is, if we pivot panel A in figure 4 and place X on the vertical axis with z on the horizontal, then the level of z corresponding to X a (labeled a z in the figure) defines what Smith and Banzhaf [2004] characterize as weak complementarity "at a point." Thus, following the same logic as with weak complementarity, this interpretation provides an alternative explanation for why z P serves as a price index for the amenity change. In the two good case, a level of X (coupled with a given income) defines a level of z. Since weak substitution identifies the level of X, X a , above which q has no value, it also implicitly defines the level of z, This analysis suggests a dual interpretation of the WC and WS preference restrictions, which is straightforward once we realize that the properties of the indirect utility function allow another interpretation of the restrictions. ( ) ⋅ V is homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. This property implies, for our two good example, that an adjustment to the price of X is equivalent to an adjustment to the price of z plus an income adjustment.
18 To illustrate how this parallel interpretation relates to applications, consider a case where weak complementarity is frequently used-a discrete choice over communities. 19 Suppose in a two community world, a household is indifferent among different levels of air quality in all communities except the community in which the household resides. That is, for a given price of housing any given community, say Community 2, the household is indifferent to air quality in any other community, say Community 1, unless the price of housing in Community 1 is low enough. In this case, we can say that housing in Community 1 is a weak complement to air quality in Community 1. Alternatively, we could say that for any given price of housing in Community 1, the household is indifferent to air quality in Community 1 unless the real price in Community 2 is high enough. In this case, we can say that housing in Community 2 is a weak substitute for air quality in Community 1. This example illustrates the logical connection, but the similarity of the two goods disguises the fact that the interpretation can be quite different. In practical applications, it will not always be possible to model z as a weak complement to q; the weak 18 Our formulation actually parallels Friedman's [1949] interpretation of the Marshallian demand curve, in which money incomes are constant but the prices of all other goods are adjusted to maintain utility levels. 19 We could have equivalently used the example of modeling the choice between different recreation sites.
substitution relationship with a private good X may be more intuitive and more empirically tractable. for utility at V, which occurs at a z . This example was selected to highlight the distinction in conditions at a z . The change need not be discrete as we discuss below. With two market goods, quantities of z below a z are equivalent to quantities of X above a X , a region in which changes in q have no value. Hence, the Hicksian demand for z, at a constant level of utility, does not change over this range with changes in q. Weak substitution provides the information that allows the value of the quality change from q 0 to q 1 to be expressed in terms of the change in the area under this demand in a way that is comparable to weak complementarity.
In this case, weak substitution allows the analyst to define ( )
and it also assures that expression (9) for the Hicksian consumer surplus (HCS) reduces to (10). of this relationship will depend on how the weak substitute and q are assumed to enter preferences. As we noted earlier, once it is acknowledged that weak substitution relationships can arise from the aggregation of one or more inputs that are actually discrete changes in the equipment available to a household, then the pattern of change in the demand for Z with q and X need not be discrete.
B. Bullock and Minot's Argument and Weak Substitution
Bullock and Minot [2006] exploit the properties of line integrals, together with the restrictions imposed by weak complementarity, to illustrate a numerical method for using changes in expenditures to measure the welfare effects of a change in a non-market good. In general line integrals assume continuous functions. Thus, to implement their method with WS could in some situations require an adaptation to account for functions that have a discrete jump. 20 Otherwise the logic is based on working with the conditional demand functions proposed by Reiss and White [2007] for welfare measures with nonlinear price schedules and uses their basic logic. 21 The first step is to derive Hicksian demands using either analytical (Hausman [1981] ) or numerical methods (e.g., Vartia [1983] ) from the Marshallian conditional demands.
The Hicksian consumer surplus (HCS) can then be derived using an adapted form of Bullock and Minot's equations (8) and (9). For WS, our equation (10) defines the value of the change in q.
This relationship plays a role similar to the weak complementarity definition does in their paper.
Note that the choke price present in Bullock and Minot's equations is replaced in our expression by the virtual price of z. This virtual price will be a function of the level of q and the price of X 20 For simple "jump discontinuities," there appear to be counterparts to the theorems underlying line integrals for continuous functions (See Apostol [1957] PP 292-297) . Their relevance will depend on the specifics of each application, that is why we selected an argument that assumes we confine attention to the conditional demand logic outlined by Hausman [1979] and adapted by Reiss and White [2007] . 21 There is an important distinction between our application here of the conditional demand logic and Reiss and White. We focus on demand with prices as constants with respect to the level of z purchased. By contrast, Reiss and White consider the case of a nonlinear budget constraint with conditional demands defined at a point for a specific marginal price.
that would yield the threshold consumption of the weak substitute, a X , at the original quality level, q 0 . As with Bullock and Minot, the Hicksian demand at q 1 (the new level of quality) is not observed. However, we know that the Marshallian and the Hicksian demands for z will be equal when income is adjusted to reflect the value of the HCS for the change from q 0 to q 1 , as in equation (11) below.
Expression (11) assumes that the demand for z is conditional on consumption of X < X a .
where the right hand side of (11) represents the Hicksian demand for z at the new quality level and the left hand side denotes the Marshallian demand for z at the new quality level given the income adjustments. As with Bullock and Minot, we do not observe D z (P z ,P a ,q 1 ,V ). To recover it we must know the threshold, a X , and thus the value of the virtual price, P a , consistent with selecting X a at q 0 , P z and m.
C. Describing Weak Substitution with an Algebraic Example
In addition to the graphical interpretation and adaptation of Bullock and Minot discussed in the last two sub-sections, we can also illustrate how WS works algebraically using the virtual price for the weak substitute. To do so we simply adapt the analysis Larson [1991] outlined for the case of a weak complement with a linear Marshallian demand function. 22 Assume equation (12) describes the Marshallian demand for X, the weak substitute for q.
where P denotes the price of the weak substitute, and m and q represent income and quality as previously. α, β, γ, and δ are parameters in the demand function. Using Hausman's [1981] logic we apply Roy's identity and integrate back to obtain the quasi-expenditure function as in equation (13), with ( )
This model is well defined for 0 < PP e and 0 ≥ X . Larson uses weak complementarity, together with the boundary conditions, to derive an expression for ( ) V q b , . We follow his logic for the case of weak substitution, making the following substitution to simplify the algebra:
. From equation (13), we derive the Hicksian demand function given in equation (14). Expression (15) provides an expression for a P , the price that induces the consumer to acquire the threshold level of the weak substitute, a X .
Substituting equation (15) into (13) for P and using weak substitution (
), we obtain a closed form expression for the constant of integration identified in equation (13). The resulting expenditure function, ( )
, is given in (16) the expression for
Setting (17) 
V. Summary and Extensions
The short answer to the rhetorical question in our title is a definite "yes". Indeed, it would seem that weak substitution offers the potential for direct application in the analysis of a wide range of private mitigating activities, especially those currently undertaken primarily by high income households. A graphical interpretation of the restriction illustrates how to define and measure the Hicksian price equivalents for amenity changes under weak substitution. The analysis also outlines how Bullock and Minot's strategy for numerical computation of the Hicksian surplus for quality changes can be adapted for the weak substitution restriction.
Weak complementarity and weak substitution are preference restrictions that imply changes in substitution effects at different threshold levels of consumption of the related private goods. Weak complementarity is generally treated as arising with non-zero consumption of the weak complement. Once we acknowledge the prospect for changes in substitution effects at different levels of consumption of private goods, there is no reason to stop with the assumption that the changes only take place once or at "corners". Instead, the possibilities are constrained only by analysts' ability to envision applications displaying the changes that implicitly underlie WC or WS.
Thus, in principle, we could have a set of changes that would parallel WC or WS relationships. Such a group of changes in substitution or complementarity between private goods and non-market services would need to identify how the threshold consumptions levels induce these switches in tradeoff relations, as was illustrated in our two-community choice example above. Suppose for the case of weak substitution that the threshold where the private good ceases to serve as a substitute for non-market quality changes with the level of the non-market good or even with the levels of other goods consumed. For example, the concierge fire protection could be differentiated based on size, location, or other characteristics of the structure being protected. Or, in the health context, at relatively low ambient lead exposure, a single course of chelation treatment may be sufficient to remove all the accumulated lead. After that single course of treatment, reductions in environmental lead would have no further value. At higher levels of ambient exposure, multiple courses of treatment may be required before exhausting the weak substitution relationship. Figure 6 illustrates such a case with the indifference curves associated with each level of q "spiraling" from a common envelop. 23 The relevant domain for each curve begins with its 23 Figure 6 is constructed using the following preference specification:, q c Z X X U * ) ( − + − = for X X ≤ respective quality-defined threshold. It is easy to see that even in this case a pivoting of the budget constraint around its X-intercept -that is, an adjustment to the price of z -can also define a compensating adjustment for the quality change. Indeed, this would be true even if q only affected the threshold point and not the marginal rate of substitution conditional on the distance from the threshold point (i.e., when q does not repackage z). The reason for this result is that, in all of these cases, the marginal rates of substitution for each fan (or spiral), fixing X, are ordered by q.
.This last example illustrates the wide variety of preference relationships open to exploration by economists. Compared with this rich potential, our almost exclusive focus on weak complementarity seems quite constrictive. In this spirit, further exploration of weak substitution may be just one step into this larger world. with a=10, b=1, and c=10 at q={1,2,3}. q both enters as a repackaging factor for Z and lowers the threshold X . (A3)
